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In Missouri, individuals who have committed a felony offense cannot vote 
until they have completed their prison sentence and any probation or parole.  
There are areas of both continuity and change over the two centuries since 
Missouri’s first constitution allowed the legislature to limit the suffrage rights 
of those convicted of infamous crimes.  In pre-Civil War Missouri, the concept 
of infamy was a part of legal culture, as was the case in other states.  Infamy 
connected the degradation of criminal activity and criminal punishment with 
the loss of citizenship rights and thus provided the intellectual foundation for 
felon disfranchisement.  In the half decade after the Civil War, disfranchise-
ment laws were used to target African American voters in most former slave 
states to achieve partisan and racial ends, and there is some evidence that this 
was the case in Missouri also.  These laws continue to disproportionately affect 
African American voters in the present day.  In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, questions of pardon, parole, and restoration of rights played 
a key role in shaping the popular and legal understanding of felon disfran-
chisement.  Today, there is no constitutional requirement to extend disfran-
chisement through probation and parole, and many other states have recently 
changed their laws so that voting rights are restored after release from incar-
ceration. 
  
* Professor of History at Middle Tennessee State University.  I am grateful to Jennifer 
Selin, the Missouri Law Review, and the Kinder Institute on Constitutional Democracy 
for inviting me to participate in the Missouri Symposium on Felon Disenfranchisement.  




Holloway: Felon Disfranchisement in Missouri: 1821–1970
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
976 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol.  84 
INTRODUCTION 
Under current Missouri law, individuals who have committed a felony 
offense cannot vote until they have completed their prison sentence and any 
probation or parole.1  Individuals convicted of election-related offenses are per-
manently barred from voting.2  As a result of these restrictions, approximately 
.5% of the eligible population of Missouri cannot vote due to a criminal con-
viction.3  
The present legal landscape is the product of a long historical legacy. Over 
the course of almost two centuries, laws and policies governing the voting 
rights of ex-offenders in Missouri have changed in response to political, social, 
and legal developments.  In other respects, much has remained the same.  The 
relevant constitutional provisions enabling disfranchisement as a punishment 
for crime have changed little over two centuries.  As it was at statehood, Mis-
souri’s current constitutional provision is not self-executing.  The constitution 
states, “Persons convicted of felony, or crime connected with the exercise of 
the right of suffrage may be excluded by law from voting.”4  This provision 
empowers the legislature to exclude convicted felons from suffrage but gives 
the legislative body much discretion in doing so. 
Today, as at the time of statehood, Missouri residents who are incarcer-
ated but otherwise eligible to vote are barred from suffrage, but disfranchise-
ment extends beyond incarceration for many.5  Missouri is one of eighteen 
states that extends disfranchisement through probation and parole, restoring 
rights to ex-felons only after they have completed court supervision.6  While 
being freed from incarceration to rejoin society might be understood to be an 
indication that one’s punishment has ended and one’s rights of citizenship have 
been restored, continuing disfranchisement through probation and parole sug-
gests that ex-felons remain tainted even when no longer incarcerated.  Missou-
rians in earlier periods weighed the question of how long disfranchisement 
should extend after incarceration, and the state has seen several different 
schemes for disfranchisement and subsequent restoration of citizenship rights 
throughout its history.7 
  
 1.  MO. Rev. Stat. § 115.133 (2018). 
 2. MO. Rev. Stat. §§ 115.133; 115.631 (2018). 
 3. Christopher Uggen et al., 6 Million Lost Voters: State-Level Estimates of Fel-
ony Disenfranchisement, 2016, THE SENT’G PROJECT (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.sen-
tencingproject.org/publications/6-million-lost-voters-state-level-estimates-felony-dis-
enfranchisement-2016/ [perma.cc/97VK-FK77]. 
 4. MO. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.   
 5. MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 14.  
 6. Uggen et al., supra note 3.  
 7. See infra Part IV.  Probation and parole did not become widely implemented 
until the late 19th century, so the capacity of those on probation and parole to vote was 
not a question in the early days of Missouri statehood. See generally CAROLYN 
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The disproportionate impact of these laws on African Americans today 
also has historical antecedents.  African Americans in Missouri are more likely 
than white voters to be disfranchised, with 5.8% of eligible African Americans 
in the state ineligible to vote due to a criminal conviction compared to 1.9% of 
the total population.8  In the post-Civil War era, these laws were used to per-
petuate racial hierarchies.9  White leaders in most states that had practiced ra-
cial slavery used and modified existing laws that disfranchised for crime to 
target African American voters, denying black men the right to political partic-
ipation they had won with the passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments.10 
This Article examines the enactment and enforcement of laws disfran-
chising for criminal convictions during three periods of Missouri history.  For 
each period, Missouri’s history is contrasted to developments in other states.  
Regional comparisons between so-called “slave” and “free-states” – those that 
maintained a system of racial slavery until the end of the Civil War and those 
that eliminated it much earlier – are also made. Each section also offers an 
overview of the national and regional landscape of these laws during the rele-
vant period.  This Article begins with an examination of pre-Civil War Mis-
souri law and an exploration of the concept of legal infamy.  Infamy is a com-
plicated and shifting concept, but it connected the degradation of criminal ac-
tivity and criminal punishment to the loss of the right to vote.11  Part III exam-
ines the Reconstruction era through the late Nineteenth century, a period where 
these laws were used to target African American voters in most former slave 
states.  Part IV encompasses the early to mid-Twentieth century.  In this period, 
questions of pardon, parole, and restoration of rights played a key role in shap-
ing the popular and legal understanding of felon disfranchisement.  This Article 
concludes with a discussion of the implications of this historical legacy for the 
present.  
I.  STATEHOOD TO THE CIVIL WAR: INFAMY 
Laws denying rights and privileges of citizenship to individuals convicted 
of certain criminal acts have long existed in the western world.  In fact, such 
practices date back to ancient Greece and Rome and have antecedents in early 
modern European law as well as in English common law.12  The practice of 
punishing serious crimes with denial of the vote migrated from Europe to the 
  
STRANGE, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: PARDON IN NEW YORK FROM THE REVOLUTION TO 
THE DEPRESSION (2016). 
 8. Uggen et al., supra note 3.  
 9. PIPPA HOLLOWAY, LIVING IN INFAMY: FELON DISFRANCHISEMENT AND THE 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 31–32 (2014).  
 10. Id. at 33–53.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. at 17–32.  
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new American republic, and by the 1830s, most states had laws disfranchising 
people convicted of major crimes.13  
A.  Missouri Law in the Early Decades of Statehood 
In advance of becoming a state in 1821, the U.S. Congress authorized 
Missouri residents to write a constitution.14  Among the provisions of the Mis-
souri Constitution of 1820 was, “The general assembly shall have the power to 
exclude from every office of honor, trust, or profit, within this state, and from 
the right of suffrage, all persons convicted of bribery, perjury, or other infa-
mous crime.”15  This authorized the newly-created General Assembly to pass 
legislation restricting voting by people with certain kinds of criminal convic-
tions. 
The legislature soon acted in accordance with this authority.  The first 
criminal statutes passed by the legislature, part of the 1825 code, punished a 
variety of crimes with disqualification from holding office, testifying in court, 
and serving on a jury, in addition to the standard criminal penalties of fines, 
imprisonment, and/or whipping.16  This suggests the legislature interpreted “of-
fice of honor, trust, or profit” broadly to include not only elected office but also 
serving on a jury or as a witness in court.  Those convicted of stealing a slave,17 
stealing a horse, mare, gelding, mule, or ass,18 counterfeiting  or forgery,19 or 
perjury lost all four of these privileges.20  Individuals who bribed public offi-
cials or bought or sold public offices could not hold office or vote but could 
testify and serve as jurors.21  Individuals convicted of bigamy were rendered 
infamous – the only mention of “infamy” in the statute – and could not hold 
office or testify.22  Individuals who received bribes for voting could no longer 
vote;23 jurors who took bribes could no longer serve as jurors. 24 
The 1825 statutes appear to have been a work in progress – at least with 
regard to infamous punishments – since the 1835 criminal code offered a 
broader and more consistent definition of infamy.25  Under the 1835 code, one 
  
 13. Id.  
 14. Act of Mar. 6, 1820, ch. 22, 16th Cong. (1820).  
 15. MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 14.  
 16. 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF MO. §§ 1–102 (1825) [hereinafter 1825 CODE] (re-
pealed 1836). 
 17. 1825 CODE § 32. 
 18. 1825 CODE § 34.  
 19. 1825 CODE §§ 42–48, 50–51. 
 20. 1825 CODE § 56. 
 21. 1825 CODE §§ 59, 62. 
 22. 1825 CODE § 76. 
 23. 1825 CODE § 86. 
 24. 1825 CODE § 64. 
 25. Compare 1825 CODE §§ 1–102 with REVISED STATS. OF MO., art. VIII (1835) 
[hereinafter REVISED STATS. OF 1835].  
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became infamous in Missouri by committing an infamous crime, including 
“every offense for which the offender, on conviction or sentence, is declared 
to be disqualified or rendered incompetent to be a witness or juror, or to vote 
at any election, or to hold any office of honor, profit or trust.”26  In short, infa-
mous crimes were those that resulted in infamous punishment.  The criminal 
code iterated which crimes brought about these infamous punishments; these 
were thus defined as infamous crimes.27  While this statute might at first glance 
seem to offer a circular definition, this was in fact a classical articulation of 
infamy.  One could become infamous because certain punishments were de-
grading and thus lowered the social status of those who received them.28  Los-
ing the right to vote, which reduced one’s function as a person of honor and 
impeded one’s role as a citizen, brought about degradation.  The legal term for 
that degradation was “infamy.”29 
This statutory definition of infamy was in line with developments in 
American law in this era, which some viewed as more democratic than English 
common law.  In 1836, the Vermont Supreme Court pointed out that allowing 
courts to determine what was infamous was “consistent with the principles of 
the English oligarchy,” but not befitting a democracy.30  In America, “it would 
seem to belong to the legislature to decide what crimes should be considered 
infamous.”31 
The criminal statutes enacted by the Missouri legislature in 1835 offered 
a list of infamous crimes that was much more extensive than the 1825 code.32  
Infamous, disfranchising crimes included crimes against the state such as trea-
son, rebellion, and insurrection.33  Many violent crimes were infamous, includ-
ing first degree murder, rape, and manslaughter, but not lesser degrees of these 
crimes, some of which were also felonies.34  Infamous punishments were given 
to those convicted of a whole list of felony- and misdemeanor-grade sex 
crimes, including rape, compelling marriage, and enticing to prostitution, as 
  
 26. REVISED STATS. OF 1835, art. VIII, § 37.  For commentary on this statutory 
article, see Barrett v. Sartorius, 175 S.W.2d 787 (Mo. 1943) (en banc).  
 27. See, e.g., REVISED STATS. OF 1835, art. VIII, § 62 (stating, “Every person who 
shall be convicted of arson burglary robbery or larceny in any degree in this Art. spec-
ified or who shall be sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for any other crime 
punishable under the provisions of this Art. shall be incompetent to be sworn as a wit-
ness or serve as a juror in any cause and shall be forever disqualified from voting at any 
election or holding any office of honor trust or profit within this state.”). 
 28. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A 
FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765–1769, at 372 (1979). 
 29. For a comprehensive discussion of the history of infamy and its 19th century 
connection to disfranchisement in the US, see HOLLOWAY, supra note 10, at 1–53.  
 30. State v. Keyes, 8 Vt. 57, 60 (Vt. 1836).  
 31. Id.  
 32. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.  
 33. REVISED STATS. OF 1835, art. I, §§ 1–10.  
 34. Id. at art. II, §§ 1–22, 42. 
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well as sexual and violent crimes against children.35  Individuals convicted of 
arson, burglary, robbery, or larceny  – in any degree – were infamous, but coun-
terfeiting was only infamous if it was at the felony level.36  All degrees of per-
jury were infamous, but other felony grade offenses against justice, such as 
bribing witnesses or accepting a bribe as a juror, were not disfranchising.37  
Abortion was not infamous, whether it was a misdemeanor or felony.38   Mis-
souri’s 1835 statutory definition of infamous crimes remained relatively un-
changed throughout the 19th century and included most felonies and some mis-
demeanors.39  One exception was treason.40  Treason resulted in infamous pun-
ishments in the pre-Civil War code, but by 1879, this punishment had been 
rescinded.41 
This understanding of infamy as being produced by the punishment, spe-
cifically the degrading punishments of disfranchisement and disqualification, 
can be seen elsewhere in Missouri statutes.  For example, under an 1879 law, 
one could be legally charged with slandering a woman by accusing her of en-
gaging in a variety of sexual offenses or acts, or “any felony, the commission 
of which would subject such person to disfranchisement and other degrading 
penalties.”42  Additionally, suggesting that a woman committed a crime that 
would have lost her the right to vote or hold office, such as cutting off some-
one’s ear, was slander.43  In short, suggesting that a woman had been degraded 
by being subjected to infamous punishments was slanderous. But accusing a 
woman of committing a crime that did not bring about these punishments, for 
example poisoning or performing an abortion, was not slander under state 
law.44  This was true even though women could not legally vote or hold office 
in Missouri in this period.  Slander could only occur if one accused someone 
of an infamous, degrading offense.45 
Missouri law aligned loosely with common law traditions.  Infamous 
crimes under common law were those that reflected immorality and deceit, 
even if they were misdemeanors.  Immorality could include crimes such as 
  
 35. Id. at art. II, §§ 25–27, 40–42. 
 36. Id. at art. III, §§ 1–35, 62. 
 37. Id. at art. V, §§ 1–44. 
 38. Id. at art. II, §§ 9–10, 42. 
 39. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. §§ 3510, 3624, 3715 (1889) (repealed). 
 40. MO. REV. STAT. § 1227 (1879) (repealed).  
 41. Id.  
 42. § 1590. 
 43. §§ 1261, 1282, 1590. 
 44. §§ 1266–68, 1282, 1590.  
 45. § 1590; see also Pippa Holloway, “They Are All She Had”: Formerly Incar-
cerated Women and the Right to Vote, 1890-1945 in CAGING BORDERS AND CARCERAL 
STATES: INCARCERATIONS, IMMIGRATION DETENTIONS, AND RESISTANCE 186–210 
(Robert T. Chase ed., 2019) (further discussing women and infamous punishments in 
the decades before women’s suffrage).  
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perjury or treason whereby one disregarded an oath and thus lacked honor.46  It 
might also include crimes of sexual immorality, such as bigamy or fornica-
tion.47  In a tradition that dated back to English common law but that extended 
through the Nineteenth century, American courts considered crimes of deceit, 
such as larceny, to be infamous, but crimes of violence, such as murder or as-
sault, generally were not considered infamous.48 
This tradition held true in Missouri, where larceny, sex-related crimes, 
and arson were infamous at both the felony and misdemeanor level.49  Common 
law did not hold violent crimes to be infamous, and in Nineteenth century Mis-
souri, many violent felonies were not infamous, including second-degree as-
sault and murder as well as other kinds of assault, wounding, and maiming.50  
For example, those who accidentally killed someone with a weapon in the heat 
of passion were guilty of manslaughter, not murder, and thus spared the pun-
ishments of disfranchisement and disqualification, an exclusion which again 
mirrored common law exclusions for violent crimes.51  In sum, while burglary, 
robbery, larceny, and arson at the felony or misdemeanor level were infamous 
and therefore disfranchising, not all degrees of murder or manslaughter were.52 
Missouri’s slave-era exclusion of crimes specific to African American 
people from the list of infamous crimes is further evidence of how legislators 
understood infamy to result from the degradation brought by punishment.53  
Enslaved people could not be rendered infamous through criminal penalties 
because they were already infamous.  For example, sexual assault of a white 
woman by an African American man was not infamous and did not have the 
penalties of disfranchisement and disqualification affixed to it.  While the ob-
vious explanation for this exclusion is that these individuals could not vote or 
hold office – so these were not rights that they could lose – understanding in-
famy offers a more sophisticated explanation.  An African American person 
convicted of such a crime could not be made infamous as a result of the con-
viction because she or he was already considered infamous.  Prisoners and 
slaves occupied the same legal status.  Enslaved people were degraded by their 
captivity, similar to how individuals punished with infamous punishments were 
degraded.54 
  
 46. 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 420–21 (12th ed. 
1866). 
 47. JOHN WITTE, JR., THE WESTERN CASE FOR MONOGAMY OVER POLYGAMY 
110–14 (2015). 
 48. See e.g., Anderson vs. Winfree, 85 Ky. 597 (Ky. 1887). 
 49. REVISED STATS. OF 1835, art. II, §§ 25–29, 42; art. III § 62. 
 50. Id. at art. II, § 2.  
 51. Id. at art. II, §§ 13, 42.  
 52. Id. at art. II, § 42, art. III, § 62.  
 53. See, e.g., id. at art. II, §§ 28, 42.  
 54. HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 1–32 (discussing in more detail the infamy of 
enslaved African Americans). 
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B.  National and Regional Comparisons 
Missouri law reflected a distinctly southern understanding of infamy that 
contrasted with the legal culture in northeastern states in the early to mid-nine-
teenth century.  Political leaders in northeastern states consciously moved away 
from the idea that infamy came from punishment and toward the idea that in-
famy came from committing serious crimes.55  For example, in 1836, the Ver-
mont Supreme Court wrote, “The old notion that infamy depended upon the 
nature of the punishment, is long since abandoned.”56  Leaders in southern 
states, in contrast, continued to see infamy as a product of the punishment.57 
These regional differences had their roots in the institution of slavery.  
Maintaining hierarchies whereby members of one segment of the population 
were permanently degraded and cast out of citizenship due to their captivity 
and subjected to humiliating punishment had long-lasting traction in the South 
because the system of punishing convicts this way mirrored the institution of 
slavery.58  Though Missouri was a border state, its legal culture was deeply 
shaped by the system of racial slavery, and this accounts for Missouri’s align-
ment with southern states regarding legal understandings of infamy.59 
Northeastern states – especially New England states that had shorter his-
tories of racial slavery – were less likely to punish crimes with the infamous 
punishments of life-long disfranchisement, bars on office-holding, and disqual-
ification from jury service and testimony.60  New England states, as well as 
states in the mid-Atlantic region, were also more likely to debate and reject 
provisions disfranchising for crime in this era.61  Delegates to constitutional 
conventions in the Northeast evidenced a distinct degree of unease with per-
manently disfranchising individuals convicted of crimes in the early to mid-
Nineteenth century.62  While some northeastern states did disfranchise for 
crime, other states in the region rejected such provisions entirely.63  In some 
other northeastern states, constitutional conventions limited the impact or ex-
tent of these provisions to protect the rights of those with criminal convic-
tions.64 
  
 55. HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 17–32. 
 56. State v. Keyes, 8 Vt. 57, 64 (Vt. 1836). 
 57. HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 1–32.   
 58. Id. at 28–30.  
 59. See generally KELLY M. KENNINGTON, IN THE SHADOW OF DRED SCOTT: ST. 
LOUIS FREEDOM SUITS AND THE LEGAL CULTURE OF SLAVERY IN ANTEBELLUM 
AMERICA (2017); ANNE TWITTY, BEFORE DRED SCOTT: SLAVERY AND LEGAL CULTURE 
IN THE AMERICAN CONFLUENCE, 1787–1857 (2016). 
 60. HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 23–31. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id.  
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In contrast, southern states uniformly enacted sweeping provisions per-
manently disfranchising for infamous or major crimes, and there is little evi-
dence of dissent or debate over this punishment in the South.  An understanding 
of infamy as the product of degrading punishments, a connection between the 
degradation of slavery and the degradation of incarceration, and a belief that 
the stain of this degradation lasted a lifetime were all characteristics of the legal 
culture in slave states.65  Missouri was admitted to the United States as a slave 
state, and slavery played a critical role in shaping Missouri’s economic, legal, 
and social development.66  Laws and practices in Missouri regarding infamy 
and disfranchisement remain one of the legacies of the slave system.  The Jim 
Crow system, which maintained white political and social power after slavery 
ended, would further shape the system of felon disfranchisement in Missouri 
into the Twentieth and Twenty-first century.67 
II.  1865–1916: DISFRANCHISEMENT TO ACHIEVE RACIAL AND 
PARTISAN ENDS 
White Missouri residents were deeply divided over secession and war, as 
were whites in many border states.68  The Republican party was unusually pow-
erful in Missouri in the war’s immediate aftermath, but as was also the case in 
other border states, former secessionists came to dominate state politics by the 
1870s.69  Their rise to power coincided with a decline in the percentage of the 
state that was African American.  In 1821, following the Missouri compromise, 
enslaved people made up about 15% of the population, a fraction that would 
drop to about 10% in 1860.70  By 1870, a growing white population made Af-
rican Americans just 7% of the total population of the state.71  Despite the de-
cline in the African American share of the population, white Missourians de-
voted much effort to maintaining political and social dominance.  Denying the 
vote to African Americans was an important part of that. 
Few changes were made to criminal disfranchisement provisions in south-
ern states in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War.  At some of the consti-
tutional conventions held in states of the former Confederacy in 1868, Repub-
licans tried, with little success, to insert constitutional provisions limiting dis-
franchisement as punishment for criminal conviction.72  Proposals in Alabama 
  
 65. Id.  
 66. Missouri Compromise, 16th Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 22, § 8 (1820). 
 67. See infra Part III. 
 68. AARON ASTOR, REBELS ON THE BORDER: CIVIL WAR, EMANCIPATION, AND THE 
RECONSTRUCTION OF KENTUCKY AND MISSOURI 75–93 (2012).  
 69.  HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, TO MAKE MEN FREE: A HISTORY OF THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY 84–86 (2014); ASTOR, supra note 68, at 4–8, 230–32. 
 70. JOHN CUMMINGS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NEGRO POPULATION: 1790–1915 57, 
68 (1918). 
 71. Id.; TWITTY, supra note 59, at 43. 
 72. See infra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.  
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and Florida, for example, unsuccessfully sought to eliminate disfranchisement 
for crime completely.73  Other efforts to curtail the reach of these laws garnered 
some support but failed to pass.74  Only in South Carolina did any significant 
limit on felon disfranchisement pass, with a constitutional provision reading: 
“No person shall be disfranchised for felony, or other crimes committed while 
such person was a slave.”75  This limited the ability of white southern Demo-
crats to accuse formerly enslaved people of having prior offenses and denying 
them the vote on that basis, something that was likely happening given this 
effort to stop it.76 
A.  Disfranchisement in Missouri After the End of Slavery 
Missouri leaders kept provisions unchanged in the 1860s.  At the state’s 
1865 constitutional convention, which was dominated by Republicans, disfran-
chisement for non-war related crimes took a back seat to larger debates about 
punishing former rebels, but three proposals are of note.77  Delegate Moses P. 
Green, a white man from Marion County, offered a plan that would have added 
“felony” to the list of disfranchising offenses, but it did not pass.78  Delegate 
Willis S. Holland, a white man from Henry County, proposed a suffrage plank 
that contained perhaps the most extensive plan for disfranchising rebels or 
those who aided them.79  His suffrage provision made no mention of disfran-
chisement for other kinds of criminals, which may have been deliberate but 
also may have been an oversight due to his enthusiasm for these other provi-
sions.80  It also specified an extensive loyalty oath.81  Delegate David Bonham, 
a white man from Andrew County, proposed adding felony, larceny, and for-
gery to the old list and also a constitutional provision for restoration of voting 
rights – a process that was provided only in statute at the time.82  
The proposals by Green and Bonham would have constitutionally ex-
panded disfranchisement to include all felonies, most notably the violent 
  
 73. OFFICIAL J. OF THE CONST. CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF AL. 81–85 (1867); 
J. OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONST. CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF FL. 19–20 (1868). 
 74. J. OF THE CONST. CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF N.C., AT ITS SESS. 1868, at 234 
(1868). 
 75. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 12.  South Carolina’s convention had a par-
ticularly significant level of African American participation, both in number and polit-
ical authority, so it is not surprising that this state went the furthest to protect African 
Americans from being targeted with laws disfranchising for prior criminal convictions. 
HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 9–10, 13. 
 76. HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 33–48. 
 77. J. OF THE MO. STATE CONVENTION HELD AT THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, JANUARY 
6–APRIL 10 (1865). 
 78. Id. at 20.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 21.  
 82. Id. 
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felonies that were excluded statutorily in an echo of common law traditions.  
This would have cleared up the complex – and likely unevenly enforced – sit-
uation whereby some but not all felonies were disfranchising offenses.83  Who 
could remember that cutting off the ears or tongue did not result in disfran-
chisement but attempting to poison someone did?  These proposals would have 
also given the force of constitutional authority to the statutory provisions and 
reclaimed some power from the legislature, as the current system ceded almost 
exclusive control over disfranchisement for crime to the legislature.84  But nei-
ther one passed.85 
The 1865 constitution kept the exact language of the previous constitution 
with regard to disfranchisement for criminal conviction.86  But there were dif-
ferences in form.  Suffrage occupied its own provision in this constitution – 
Article II – a change from the 1820 document.87  Article II established a regis-
tration system for the first time.88  Section 15 of Article II disfranchised and 
barred from office-holding for ten years anyone “convicted of having directly 
or indirectly given or offered any bribe to procure his election or appointment 
to any office,” by stating that they “shall be disqualified for any office of honor 
trust or profit under this State and whoever shall give or offer any bribe to 
procure the election or appointment of any other person to any office shall on 
conviction.”89  It also stipulated, “No person who shall make or become di-
rectly or indirectly interested in any bet or wager depending upon the result of 
any election shall vote at such election.”90  
Statutorily, not much changed with regard to disfranchisement of ex-of-
fenders in Reconstruction Era Missouri.91  The only exception revolved around 
the issue of betting.92  In 1871, the legislature passed an entirely revised regis-
tration statute that included a provision denying the vote to those “directly or 
indirectly interested in any bet or wager depending upon the result of the elec-
tion.”93 
Toward the end of Reconstruction, many southern states changed their 
laws to make misdemeanor larceny a disfranchising offense.94  Whereas dis-
franchisement was traditionally a punishment only for serious crimes, in a con-
certed effort to deny African Americans the vote, most southern states made 
misdemeanor larceny – commonly referred to as “petit larceny” – a 
  
 83. MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 14. 
 84. Id.  
 85. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text.  
 86. MO. CONST. of 1865, art. II, § 26. 
 87. Id. at art. II. 
 88. Id. at art. II, § 4. 
 89. Id. at § 15. 
 90. Id. at § 17. 
 91. MO. REV. STAT § 117.001 (1872). 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 54–78 (2014). 
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disfranchising offense.95  Though other disfranchising techniques such as liter-
acy tests and poll taxes had the biggest overall impact on the black vote, dis-
franchising for misdemeanor larceny was part of a growing effort to use real 
and false allegations of former criminal convictions to intimidate and disfran-
chise the black population.96 
Missouri’s elected political leaders, unlike those in most other southern 
states, did not have to change state law or the constitution in this period to 
disfranchise for petit larceny.  All grades of larceny resulted in disfranchise-
ment, dating back to 1835.97  Even though the 1875 convention did not make 
any changes to the constitutional provisions with regard to disfranchisement 
for criminal conviction, the 1875 convention debated the issue.98  Delegates 
engaged in discussions of what constituted infamous crimes, the distinction be-
tween infamous crimes and felonies, and most especially, whether petit larceny 
was an infamous crime in Missouri and thus a disfranchising offense.99  
Since “infamy” was defined as any crime the statute punished with denial 
of suffrage and other privileges of citizenship, the constitutional provision 
denying the vote to those considered infamous gave complete power to the leg-
islature.100  Delegate H. B. Johnson, a white man and one of the convention’s 
few Republicans, expressed concern that the constitution’s delegation of this 
authority to the legislature could lead to a wide expansion of disfranchising 
crimes: 
Now the Legislature might say every man who don't go to church on 
Sunday shall not vote and thereby make that an infamous crime.  The 
Legislature in its discretion may prohibit a man from voting, but then to 
say in the Constitution that the Legislature may declare anything infa-
mous that is giving unlimited power to the Legislature to disfranchise 
anyone under the guise of multiplying offences for which a person shall 
not be permitted to vote by denominating them “infamous crimes.” . . . 
That amounts to giving the Legislature unlimited power to say that a 
man shall not vote for any trivial thing that he may do.101 
A number of delegates seemed unclear on what “infamy” meant, engag-
ing in lengthy discussions over the difference between felonies and infamous 
crimes, common law definitions of each, whether crimes bringing disfranchise-
ment should also produce disqualification from office-holding, and more.102  
  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. REVISED STATS. OF 1835, art. III, § 62. 
 98. 5 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at 141–
50 (Isidor Loeb & Floyd Shoemaker, eds. 1875).   
 99. Id. at 148–50.  
 100. Id. at 148.  
 101. Id. at 147–48.  
 102. Id. at 141–50.  
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Delegate Thomas Tasker Gantt offered a provision: “The General Assembly 
may enact laws excluding from the right of voting all persons convicted of 
misdemeanors connected with the exercise of the right of suffrage or of fel-
ony.”103  This measure would have ended disfranchisement for petit larceny, 
limiting the power of conservative Democrats to use this as a tool against Af-
rican American voters as they had in other states.104  It is quite possible that 
Gantt knew what he was doing here.  Gantt was a white man and a Democrat, 
but he had been a Unionist during the war, a judge advocate for General George 
McClellan, and then, provost marshal general of Missouri.105  At the time of 
the convention, he was the presiding judge on the St. Louis Court of Appeals.106  
He certainly knew the law and was as likely as any other member of the con-
vention to have an understanding of regional trends.  Delegate Charles B. 
McAfee, a Democrat and attorney, replied to Gantt’s proposal by demanding 
that all infamous crimes, thus including petit larceny, be disfranchising crimes: 
“If the gentleman will add to it – ‘or other infamous crimes’ so as to punish 
petit larceny the same as grand larceny I will vote for his proposition.”107  
A more in-depth analysis of the work of the convention and the political 
affiliation of its delegates could evaluate connections between the Missouri 
convention and the broader debates over disfranchisement for petit larceny that 
occurred in other former slave states in this period.  Were efforts by delegates 
to limit disfranchisement to felony offenses done with the intention of elimi-
nating disfranchisement for petit larceny, a practice that had been used for par-
tisan and racial ends in other states?  It is clear from the discussion – McAfee’s 
reply to Gantt for example – that ensuring that individuals convicted of petit 
larceny remained disfranchised was a priority for some of the members.108  This 
suggests that events in other states were on their mind. 
B.  Regional Comparisons 
Events in other states during the 1870s and 1880s revealed the racial and 
partisan impact of laws disfranchising for crime.  In a hotly contested 1880 
  
 103. Id. at 141.  
 104. Id.  
 105. 1 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at 85 (Is-
idor Loeb & Floyd Shoemaker, eds. 1920); JOHN FLETCHER DARBY, PERSONAL 
RECOLLECTIONS OF MANY PROMINENT PEOPLE WHOM I HAVE KNOWN, AND OF EVENTS 
– ESPECIALLY OF THOSE RELATING TO THE HISTORY OF ST. LOUIS – DURING THE FIRST 
HALF OF THE PRESENT CENTURY (1880). 
 106. Id.  
 107.  5 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, supra 
note 98, at 146; JONATHAN FAIRBANKS & CLYDE EDWIN TUCK, PAST AND PRESENT OF 
GREENE COUNTY, MISSOURI (1915). 
 108. 5 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, supra 
note 98, at 146.  Another issue debated at the convention was disfranchisement of indi-
viduals who bet on elections. Id. at 149. 
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election in Florida, African American voters later testified that in the weeks 
before the election, scores of black men were prosecuted for a range of small 
crimes: theft of a gold button, burglary of three oranges, stealing hogs, larceny 
of oats, larceny of six fish (worth twelve cents), and theft of a cowhide.109  One 
of them – the man who supposedly stole the oranges –  testified before Con-
gress that such charges had become more frequent “because the election was 
close on hand.”110  Another, this one an alleged hog thief, confirmed this say-
ing, “It was a pretty general thing to convict colored men in that precinct just 
before an election; they had more cases about election time than at any other 
time.”111  
A similar scene unfolded in Richmond, Virginia in 1888.  There, on Elec-
tion Day, the Democratic party stationed “challengers” – official partisan elec-
tion monitors – at the city’s three predominantly African American precincts 
in Jackson Ward, where they spent the day questioning voter eligibility.112  
Only African American voters underwent this interrogation.113  Each time a 
challenger disputed the credentials of a voter, the accusation had to be evalu-
ated by an attendant panel of bipartisan precinct judges.114  These judges con-
firmed with voters their age, the spelling of their name, and their place of resi-
dence.115  The Democratic judges colluded with the Democratic challengers by 
slowly and carefully verifying the information on the registration lists.116  Any 
voter whose credentials were suspect had to swear an oath that he was qualified 
to vote, and each was informed he faced perjury charges if a later check of his 
credentials disqualified him.117 
One particular kind of challenge took a disproportionate amount of time: 
voters who were accused of having a prior criminal conviction.  Prior to elec-
tion day, the precinct judges had received lists of voters made ineligible be-
cause of criminal conviction.118  Upon each challenge, the judges combed 
through the list of convicts, which contained about two thousand names, 
searching for that individual’s name.  Because the segregated precinct had sep-
arate lines for the two races, white voting proceeded apace while African 
American voters waited for hours.  Over five hundred black voters were still 
  
 109. Testimony in the Contested Election Case of Horatio Bisbee, Jr. vs. Jesse J. 
Finley, from the Second Congressional District of Florida, H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 11, at 
414–15, 47th Cong., 1st Sess. 414–19 (1881); HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 54. 
 110. Testimony in the Contested Election Case of Horatio Bisbee, Jr. vs. Jesse J. 
Finley, from the Second Congressional District of Florida, H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 11, at 
414–15, 47th Cong., 1st Sess. 4145 (1881). 
 111. Id. at 469; HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 54–55. 
 112. HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 55. 
 113. Id. at 143.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Pippa Holloway, “A Chicken-Stealer Shall Lose His Vote”: Disfranchisement 
for Larceny in the South, 1874–1890, 75 J. OF S. HIST. 931, 951–54 (2009). 
 116. Id.  
 117. HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 70–71. 
 118. Holloway, supra note 115, at 951–54.  
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waiting in line to vote when the polls closed.  Many others had given up due to 
frustration or intimidation.119 
C.  Racial Implications in Early Twentieth Century Missouri 
The first election in Missouri in which these laws were used for racial and 
partisan ends came at a St. Louis election in 1916.120  Though these laws had 
long been on the books in Missouri, their use for this purpose came later than 
in other former slave states likely because African Americans had not been a 
significant electoral force prior to this time.121  In the early decades of the 
Twentieth Century, however, black migration to the state was on the rise with 
St. Louis being the primary destination for these new residents.122  In 1910, the 
city was home to 43,960 African American residents; by 1920, there were 
69,854.123  The electoral power of the black population was growing, and thus 
so would efforts to limit it.  
The 1916 presidential election was hotly contested, and many correctly 
predicted that Missouri would be a key battleground.124  Democrats hoped the 
state would go to Woodrow Wilson while Republicans hoped to put the state’s 
electoral votes in Republican Charles Evans Hughes’s column.125  Democratic 
Party operatives in the city coordinated efforts to target African American vot-
ers with stepped-up enforcement of laws disfranchising for crime.126  This elec-
tion is particularly significant to the history of felon disfranchisement in Mis-
souri.  Many new African American voters had migrated to Missouri from 
southern states, and the practice of disfranchising for prior criminal convic-
tions, as well as racially motivated enforcement of these laws, followed these 
black voters out of the South.  Republicans, the party with which the majority 
of Missouri’s black voters were affiliated, accused Democrats of “southerniz-
ing” the election, i.e. manipulating election practices, including laws disfran-
chising for crime, to target African Americans.127  A few weeks before the 
election, Democratic leaders dispatched about twenty young attorneys to comb 
the criminal court records and compile lists of African American voters who 
had been convicted of crimes.128  This research produced a list of approximately 
  
 119. Id. at 17 (1890); HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 70–71. 
 120. HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 141.  
 121. Id. at 139–40.  
 122. KENNETH JOLLY, BLACK LIBERATION IN THE MIDWEST: THE STRUGGLE IN ST. 
LOUIS, MISSOURI, 1964–1970 6 (2006). 
 123. Id.  
 124. HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 141–48.  
 125. Id. at 141.  
 126. Bring the Vote Thieves to Judgment, ST. LOUIS ARGUS, at 1 (Nov. 10, 1916). 
 127. Id.; HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 133.   
 128. HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 141.  
 
15
Holloway: Felon Disfranchisement in Missouri: 1821–1970
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
990 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol.  84 
three thousand names, about 25% of the registered African American voters in 
the city.129  
Then, the day before the election, the Democratic party took out an ad in 
the newspaper warning black voters:  
 
Democratic challengers in every affected precinct in the sixteen wards 
have been given a list of the negroes who have registered illegally.  AS 
RAPIDLY AS THEY ARRIVE AT THE POLLS THEY WILL BE 
CHALLENGED.  IF THEY INSIST ON CASTING THEIR BALLOTS 
AND START TO SWEAR IN THEIR VOTE, THEY WILL BE 
ARRESTED AT ONCE, CHARGED WITH PERJURY.130 
 
This was a formidable threat.  African American citizens, particularly 
these southern migrants, would have had longstanding experiences with vio-
lence and intimidation at the ballot box.  But in contrast to southern states, 
Missouri had a relatively powerful Republican party that could offer them a 
modicum of support and protection.131  Concerned that this would dissuade 
African American voters from casting their ballot, Republicans responded by 
publishing a reassuring notice in the local African American newspaper, the St. 
Louis Argus.132  They advised city residents that voters who were properly reg-
istered “need not fear any man,” and free legal counsel would be available for 
those who needed it.133  
Then, on Election Day, the Democrats stationed “challengers” in black 
precincts.134  Accounts vary but apparently many, if not most, African Ameri-
can men who voted faced a challenge of their credentials based on these lists.135  
Some gave up and left as soon as the challenge was issued.136  In some precincts 
police officers arrested African American voters immediately after they were 
challenged.137  In other instances, they waited until the judges had allowed the 
individual to vote and then arrested him.138  Police escorted others out of the 
polling place without arrest but prevented them from voting.139  The final count 
held that police arrested ninety-six African Americans and two whites upon 
allegations of trying to vote with prior disfranchising convictions.140 
An important side effect of all this controversy was significant delays for 
voters, particularly at precincts in African American neighborhoods.  A 
  
 129. Id. at 141–42.  
 130. Id. at 142.  
 131. Id. at 144.  
 132. Warning to Negro Voters, ST. LOUIS ARGUS, at 1 (Nov. 3, 1916).  
 133. Id.; HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 142.  
 134. HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 143.  
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. at 144.  
 137. Id. at 143–44. 
 138. Id. at 144.  
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. at 139–50. 
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Republican Party official told the press that he knew of precincts where the 
wait stretched to two hours while challengers and judges interrogated the vot-
ers.141  According to another Republican leader, sixty voters waited two hours 
to vote at a precinct on Laclede Avenue, but only eight were successful.142 
After the election, two men, Henry Lucas and John L. Sullivan, who were 
among those wrongfully disfranchised by false accusations of prior criminal 
convictions, initiated civil suits against Democratic Party leaders.143  These 
court cases are some of the earliest legal actions by African Americans chal-
lenging the enforcement of laws disfranchising for crime.  The first to file was 
Henry Lucas, a thirty-two-year-old teamster and Missouri native.144  Lucas was 
arrested in the fifth precinct of the Eighth Ward following an accusation from 
a white Democratic challenger, Theodore Sandman, that he had a prior grand 
larceny conviction and had spent time in prison for it in 1906.145  Another dis-
franchised African American voter, John L. Sullivan, filed suit shortly after 
Lucas.146  Sullivan claimed that when he tried to vote, a Democratic challenger 
asserted that he had been convicted of petit larceny in 1896 and had served a 
forty-one-day sentence in the workhouse.147  Sullivan denied all of this.148  He 
said he had never been in the workhouse nor convicted nor arrested any-
where.149  He was not even living in St. Louis in 1896 – he moved there in 
1910.150  While Sullivan’s suit was unsuccessful, a jury found in favor of Lu-
cas, awarding actual damages of $250 and $50 in punitive damages.151  
The success of using accusations of prior convictions to limit the African 
American vote in 1916 may have fueled an effort to expand felon disfranchise-
ment in Missouri in 1922.  At the 1922 constitutional convention, many pro-
posals were considered to restrict the vote even more.152  One proposal focused 
on expanding disfranchisement for crime: a provision by delegate J.E. Cahill 
that would have allowed the legislature to disfranchise for any and all crimes.153  
Under Cahill’s plan anyone convicted of a felony, infamous crime, or any mis-
demeanor could be denied suffrage.154  Cahill’s proposal did not pass.155  
 
  
 141. Id. at 145.  
 142. Id. at 139.  
 143. Id. at 146–47.  
 144. Id. at 146.  
 145. Id.   
 146. Id. at 147.  
 147. Id.  
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. 
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. at 145–50.  
 152. PROPOSALS, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF MISSOURI, 1922–1923 (1922). 
 153. Id. at 159.  
 154. Id.  
 155. Id.  
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III.  TWENTIETH CENTURY: PARDONS, PAROLE, AND RESTORATION 
OF RIGHTS 
 
In the decades after 1916, the most significant legal disputes and historical 
developments in Missouri regarding criminal disfranchisement revolved not so 
much around which criminal offenders would lose their voting rights but by 
what processes they might re-obtain them.  At times, these individual efforts 
formed a pattern and were either in response to or a reflection of larger social 
and political changes. 
In the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries, many states worked 
out constitutional and bureaucratic procedures by which convicted individuals 
might be relieved of punishment and sanctions.156  This development owed 
much to a growing adherence to legal formalism and an expanding belief that 
constitutional rights could define, and often limit, the extent of government 
power – what historian William Novak has called a “cult of constitutionalism” 
that emerged after the Civil War.157  This combined with the push toward stand-
ardization and bureaucratization in the Progressive Era to lead states to estab-
lish formal constitutional and legal processes for restoring rights.158 
A.  Pardons and Gubernatorial Authority in Missouri 
The first hint at the growing significance of pardons to restore citizenship 
rights came at the 1875 Missouri constitutional convention.159  Delegate Ben-
jamin F. Massey expressed concern about the broad pardon powers granted to 
the governor with regard to suffrage.  In the past, he observed:  
 
A man would be pardoned the day before his term was out.  Well, I 
know what that was for.  It was to remove his political disability; then 
what becomes of those infamous crimes?  If I wish to make them a dis-
qualification for voting; and if you take hold of a man for those things, 
another man steps in and wipes them all out, what remedy have you?160   
 
Massey’s concerns about the balance of power between the branches and 
the reach of gubernatorial authority were prescient.  Missouri’s constitution did 
not provide for a specific act of clemency that restored voting rights but it did 
  
 156. WILLIAM NOVACK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION IN 
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 246–48 (1996); HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 111. 
 157. NOVACK, supra note 156, at 246; HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 111. 
 158. NOVACK, supra note 156, at 246–249; HOLLOWAY, supra note 9, at 111–12; 
see also MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE 
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1986). 
 159. 5 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, supra 
note 98, at 144–45. 
 160. Id. at 144.  
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give the governor broad pardon powers.161  The Missouri legislature limited 
the power of the pardon in 1879.162  Those who lost the right to vote due to a 
criminal conviction could vote if pardoned, allowing pardons and restorations 
for first offenses but “after a second conviction of felony or other infamous 
crime, or of a misdemeanor connected with the exercise the right of suffrage, 
he shall be forever excluded from voting.”163 
The governor’s power to restore suffrage for first time offenders remained 
unlimited in the half century to come, but a 1917 law gave the parole board the 
ability to restore suffrage in some cases as well.164  Part of a major legislative 
overhaul of the state prison system, a provision known as the “Three-Fourths 
Rule” allowed incarcerated individuals who served their time “in an orderly 
and peaceable manner” to be released after serving three fourths of their sen-
tence.165  Moreover: 
 
[A]t the end of five years from such discharge . . . such convict shall 
thereupon be restored to all the rights of citizenship provided, that he or 
she shall not have been indicted, informed against by the prosecuting or 
circuit attorney, or convicted of any other crime, during such period, and 
shall obtain a certificate to that effect from the Prison Pardon Board, 
whose duty it shall be, upon proper showing, to issue the same and keep 
a record thereof.166  
 
This addressed a contradiction in current practice: individuals pardoned 
and released had their rights restored automatically as a result of the pardon.167  
But those whose good behavior warranted early release under parole did not 
have this privilege – parolees had to apply for restoration of rights.168  In a 
sense, individuals with good behavior were being punished more, and this re-
vision resolved that contradiction.169 
B.  The Nineteenth Amendment and Pardoning Women with Felony 
Convictions 
Pardons soon became important to another group of Missouri residents: 
female ex-offenders.  Missouri was an early “partial suffrage” state, meaning 
that women were allowed to vote in the 1919 presidential election before the 
  
 161. See MO. CONST. of 1820, art. IV, § 2; MO. CONST. of 1865, art. V, § 6. 
 162. MO. REV. STAT. § 5492 (1879) (repealed). 
 163. Id. 
 164. State Board Prison Act, 49th Legis., 1st Sess. (Mo. 1917). 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id.  
 167. Id.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Those who served their full term and were neither discharged early on parole 
or pardoned were disfranchised for life unless pardoned.   
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federal suffrage amendment passed.170  This may explain why two Missouri 
women can be found in some of the earliest records of petitions for restorations 
of voting rights.  Anna Hunning, a white woman who lived in Valley Park, 
sought access to the franchise with particular urgency.171  Convicted of murder 
and sentenced to life in 1912, she was released on parole in 1919.172  Her parole 
expired on January 1, 1921, and on January 3, she submitted a petition to Gov-
ernor Frederick Gardner for restoration to citizenship.173  The petition was a 
standard document printed by the state for such occasions.174  On Hunning’s 
form, someone crossed out “his” and substituted “her.”175  Clearly, Missouri 
was not yet prepared for petitions for restoration of citizenship from female 
applicants.176 
About six months later, Missouri Governor Arthur Hyde heard from Cora 
Blackwell, whose race is unidentified in the pardon records.177  Blackwell was 
convicted of aiding and abetting a rape in St. Louis in 1903 when she was 
twenty-two years old.178  She was sentenced to five years in the penitentiary 
and was released in 1907.179  In July 1921, she petitioned for a pardon so that 
she could have her citizenship rights restored.180  Her petition listed her em-
ployment as a “house wife” and was signed by twenty individuals.181 
Efforts by African American women with criminal convictions in Mis-
souri to vote offer evidence of particular determination to overcome multiple 
barriers to suffrage.  In 1932, an African American woman named Annie Tas-
sin contacted the Missouri governor to request restoration of her citizenship.182  
According to the form Tassin submitted, she had been convicted of “burglar 
[sic] in second degree.”183  For date of conviction she wrote, “Can’t remember 
exactly.”184  Her enclosed petition was endorsed by ten female signatories 
along with fourteen men.185  Still, the state’s petition form had not changed.186  
Tassin crossed out the “his” and changed it to “her.”187 
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Tassin wrote a letter to the governor to accompany her petition, and in it, 
she suggested an additional reason to have her citizenship restored.188  She ex-
plained that she would “love to have [her] citizenship back, for it means so 
much to [her] in [her] life to live.”189  Why was it so important?  For one, she 
“want[ed] to live a true life.”190  In addition, she told the governor that she 
sought a pardon because she was “identified by so many organizations.”191  
Tassin’s comments indicate that being disfranchised for a prior criminal con-
viction affected her social status in the community.192  Organizations she had 
joined – likely women’s clubs and benevolent organizations – must have 
frowned on her criminal past, and so she sought to have her record cleared as 
much as possible.193 
Another African American female voter, Mary Cole, who lived in Jeffer-
son City, sought restoration of her citizenship rights in 1930.194  Mary Cole’s 
petition was accompanied by a letter to the governor from the prosecuting at-
torney in the county – a white man named Otto Ankersheil.195  Ankersheil 
wrote that Cole and her husband were “old colored people who came into this 
county from Arkansas and had not been in the state but about nine months.”196  
Ankersheil explained that a candidate for a local election had sought their vote 
and drove them to the polling place, where they voted.197  Because they were 
recent migrants and not eligible to vote, they were arrested.198  Ankersheil con-
cluded, “In my opinion it was purely a matter of ignorance on the part of these 
old darkies being persuaded to vote by a white man in whom they put confi-
dence and there was no intention on their part to violate the law.”199  
Shifting the lens to Cole and her husband’s perspective changes the story 
drastically.  Here is another version of the tale: as soon as they got out of Ar-
kansas, leaving behind a state where white southern Democrats denied them 
suffrage, the Coles were so determined to vote that they convinced a white 
politician to drive them to the polling place.200  Then, charged with being inel-
igible to vote, they blamed their crime on the white politician and chauffeur 
and sought the restoration of their citizenship rights, gathering signatures and 
securing the sympathy and support of the local prosecutor.201  With her 
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citizenship now restored, Cole could again participate in an election.202  One 
suspects that within the year she did exactly that.203 
CONCLUSION: STATE EX REL. OLIVER V. HUNT AND THE LONG 
HISTORY OF DISFRANCHISEMENT IN MISSOURI 
The Missouri statute that allowed restoration of voting rights five years 
after discharge under the Three Fourths Rule was challenged in 1952 in State 
ex rel. Oliver v. Hunt.204  At issue was whether the legislation automatically 
restoring suffrage rights under the parole law undermined the governor’s au-
thority to pardon.205  The Missouri Supreme Court held that the legislature 
could restore voting rights to individuals in such circumstances and that ex-
tending this power to the legislature did not limit gubernatorial power.206  
Moreover, the court made an interesting argument justifying the distinction be-
tween the parole law’s restoration of rights and a gubernatorial pardon.207  Par-
dons were acts of mercy and a “derogation of law.”208  In contrast, the parole 
law was rehabilitative.209 
In deciding State ex rel. Oliver v. Hunt, the court took the opportunity to make 
an argument in favor of restoration of rights for those released from incarcera-
tion:  
Prior to the enactment of the parole law in 1897, all persons, no matter 
how extenuating the circumstances, were upon conviction forced to un-
dergo the punishment fixed by statute.  After undergoing the stigma and 
degradation of imprisonment, they far too often became vicious repeat-
ers.  Following the enactment of this law, tens of thousands of men, 
given the supervision and encouragement of its provisions, have been 
restored to good citizenship.  Thousands of these men, who, but for the 
very statute here sought to be declared unconstitutional, would be 
branded as felons, unworthy of the right of franchise, unworthy to serve 
as jurors or to hold positions of honor or trust, are today exercising those 
rights with honor to themselves and this State.  These privileges ought 
not be taken from them, nor should future transgressors be denied the 
incentive of reformation that Section 549.170 has so successfully 
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inspired in others since its enactment, unless there is impelling reason 
for so doing.  Society would not profit thereby.210 
These conflicting perspectives on incarceration – whether it is intended 
for retribution or rehabilitation – have shaped discussions of the restoration of 
voting rights for ex-felons throughout American history.  The court’s reference 
to “degradation” evokes the long history of infamy and the social and political 
stigma attached to infamous punishments.211  In contrast, those who voted were 
doing so “with honor,” an indication that for these individuals the mark of in-
famy was now gone.212  The court saw a private good in the restoration of their 
rights, to the extent that these individuals now received more respect, but also 
a public good because restoration of rights incentivized reform.213   
Finally, the court underscored the powerful role that Missouri’s legisla-
ture has in determining the voting rights of ex-felons.  The opinion notes, “This 
clause vests wide discretion in the legislature to determine the extent to which 
persons convicted of felony may be excluded from the right of suffrage.”214  
The history of felon disfranchisement in Missouri bears this out.  At times the 
Missouri legislature has chosen to impose broad, life-long disfranchisement 
and at other times it has chosen to limit it.  At times the power to restore citi-
zenship has been exclusively the governor’s and at other times the legislature 
has appropriated this power as well.   
As it has since statehood, Missouri’s present constitution offers the legis-
lature the ability to exclude felons from voting but does not require it.  There 
is no constitutional requirement to extend disfranchisement through probation 
and parole.  Many other states have recently changed their laws so that voting 
rights are restored after release from incarceration.215  The Missouri legislature 
could act at any time to restore voting rights at the time of release from prison.  
There is no constitutional mandate for disfranchisement during incarceration 
in Missouri either.  Arguments for expanding access to the franchise for ex-
felons and even those who are currently incarcerated can be grounded in an 
understanding of both the continuity of these laws and the changes in them over 
the scope of Missouri’s history. 
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